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BAR BRIEFS
Dwelling House Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S. W. 1016,
4 L. R. A. 458 (1889).
"The information given to the agent operated as notice to the
company, and it having accepted the premium and assumed the
risk, it must be held that the company has waived the condition,
or if not, it is estopped from urging its breach as a defense. To
permit such a defense would be highly unjust and iniquitous. It
would shock the sense of right and fair dealing to permit money
to be obtained under such assurances, and to permit the company
to say, we are not bound, and did not intend, on our part, to be
bound for any loss that might occur; we misled and deceived you
into paying the premium, and although we did not intend to be
bound, and knew we were not, still we will keep the premium,
and you must suffer the loss. This is the substance of the de-
fense and such a defense cannot be allowed to prevail." St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Wells, 89 Ill. 82 (1876).
This writer is of the opinion that the court would have been
justified in decreeing that the insurer was estopped from denying
liability under the policy. In the case under discussion the fed-
eral court was bound to apply the law of the state where the con-
tract was consummate and which happened to be New Jersey. It
is highly probable that if the same court were trying an identical
case and applying North Dakota law that the result would be con-
tra to the NewJersey decisicn and in accord with the rule laid
down in North Dakota and a majority of the state courts.
TELMAR E. ROLSTAD
Law Student
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Osage National Bank, a National Banking Corporation, Pltf. and
Respt., vs. Oakes Special School District, a Public Corporation, Deft. and
AppIt.
That where the Legislature, under the State Constitution, had the
power to authorize a school district to increase its debt limit upon secur-
ing the assent of a majority of the voters voting at an election held within
the district, it could by retrospective legislation validate an indebtedness
of a district which at the time it was incurred, was within the limit the
Legislature had power to authorize and to which limit the electors of the
district had assented at an election, which, though previously unauthorized,
was such a proceeding that it would have constituted a valid election had
it had prior legislative sanction.
That Chapter 278, Laws of North Dakota 1923 is, for the reasons
stated in the opinion, held to validate certain warrants issued by the de-
fendant.
Appeal from the District Court of Dickey County, Hon. W. H. Hutch-
inson, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In State of North Dakota, Respt., vs. W. F. McClelland, Deft. and Applt.
That the right to a new trial is purely statutory and a trial court has
no jurisdiction to entertain or grant a motion for a new trial noticed for
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hearing after the statutory time for making a motion for new trial has ex-
pired.
That a motion for a new trial and an appeal from a judgment are
separate remedies and the taking of an appeal does not extend the time
within which a motion for a new trial must be made.
That the right of appeal is not conferred by the Constitutional. An
appeal to the Supreme Court may be had only under such regulations as
may be prescribed by law. (Sec. 109 N. D. Const.)
That an appeal from a judgment only, brings to the Supreme Court
for review errors of law committed by the trial court and appearing in
the record of the action which have been preserved and presented in the
manner prescribed by statute.
That sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, not challenged
either by motion for a new trial or for an advised verdict, cannot be con-
sidered on an appeal from the judgment alone.
That in order to secure a review of the propriety of instructions to the
jury or the refusal of requested instructions, exceptions must be taken
in the manner prescribed by sections 10824 and 10825, Comp. Laws N. D.
1913.
That where a witness answered an ambiguous question on cross-ex-
amination, it was not error to permit her to explain on redirect examina-
tion what she understood the question to be and to state what she meant
by her answer.
Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, Hon. G. Grimson,
Special Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, Ch.
In Edwin M. Bonde, Fred B. Bonde, Fannie E. Brownson, Flora K.
Cooper, et al., Respts., vs. William Stern and B. G. Tenneson, Applts.
That an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution or perform-
ance of the judgment or order appealed from. (C. L. 1913, Sections 7825-
7833), unless the appeal is one taken by the state, or a state board, in a
purely official capacity, or a municipal corporation within the state. (C. L.
1913, Section 7834).
That stay of proceedings pending an appeal is an independent collateral
proceeding, and the appellate proceeding proper remains wholly unaffect-
ed the reby. Absence of such stay, or defects rendering the stay
order invalid, do not affect the right of the appellant to a review of the
judgment or order appealed from.
That under the laws of North Dakota it is the trial court that is vested
with authority to fix the amount of a stay bond and the conditions on
which a stay may be had pending appeal to the supreme court in all cases
where the amount of a stay bond or the conditions on which a stay may
be had are required to be fixed by a court; and it is only "when the court
or the judge thereof from which the appeal is taken or desired to be taken
shall neglect or refuse to make any order -or direction not wholly discret
ionary, necessary to enable the appellant to stay proceedings upon an
appeal", that "the supreme court, or one of the justices thereof" may
make "such order or direction." (C. L. 1913, Section 7835).
That an order overruling a demurer to a complaint is appealable
(C. L. 1913, Section 7841, sub-division 3); and a defendant in a civil action
has an absolute and unconditional right to appeal from an order over-
ruling his demurrer to plaintiff's complaint; but he does not have such
right to a stay of enforcement of such order pending appeal.
That whether there shall be a stay of proceedings pending an appeal
from an order overruling a demurer to a complaint is a matter within the
discretion of the trial court. The trial court may order a stay, and pre-
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scribe the conditions on which the stay shall become effective, and as a
part of such conditions he may order that the appellant furnish an under-
taking in such sum and to such effect as the exigencies of the case war-
rant. (C. L. 1913, Section 7832).
That a stay order may be vacated for good cause shown. The appli-
cation to vacate should be made to the court which ordered the stay; and
where a district court has ordered a stay of proceedings under section
7832, C. L. 1913, application to vacate the stay should be made to the dis-
trict court, it should not be made to the supreme court, in the first in-
stance. Moore vs. Booker, 4 N. D. 543, 62 N. W. 607 distinguished. ,
That where the district court as It condition for stay of proceedings
pending an appeal from an order overruling a demurer to a complaint re-
quired appellant to furnish a bond in a designated sum and to a specified
effect, the stay order is not rendered invalid by the fact that notice of
application for the stay was not given to the adverse party as prescribed
by section 7836, C. L. 1913; but the stay order will remain in force, and
be deemed binding and effective until it is set aside.
That an order staying proceedings pending appeal from an order over-
ruling a demurrer to a complaint suspends the right of the plaintiff to
proceed on the complaint, and he is not entitled to have defendant adjudged
to be in default and to have judgment rendered in contravention of the
stay order.
Application by plaintiffs for a writ commanding the district court to
hear and determine plaintiffs' motion for default and for judgment; or for
an order setting aside a stay order; and directing the district court to hear
and determine plaintiffs' motion for default and for jujdgment.
DENIED. Per Curiam.
In Otter Tail Power Company, a corporation, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Ethel
Baker and Frank Pfeifer, Defts., Frank Pfeifer, Deft. and Respt.
That this is a companion case to Otter Tail Power Company vs. Von
Bank, - N. D. - N. W. 2d -. All the questions of law raised in
the Von Bank case were raised in the instant case and their determina-
tion in that case controls here.
That in the instant case plaintiff also predicated error on certain rul-
ings on questions of evidence. The record is examined and held for reas-
ons stated in the opinion, that the rulings challenged were erroneous and
prejudicial.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Holt J Proceeding
in eminent domain to condemn an easement for a right of way for an elec-
tric transmission line. From a judgment for the defendant Pfeifer for
damages, plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Nuessle, J.
In Esther Groff, Pltf. and Applt., vs. State of North Dakota doing busi-
ness as Workmen's Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Respt.
That a claim to share in the workmen's compensation fund should be
filed with the bureau within sixty days from the date of the accident but
the bureau, in its discretion, may permit the filing of the claim after the
expiration of the sixty days, provided the claim be filed within one year
from the date of the accident.
That where one, claiming to share in the workmen's compensation
fund, fails to file his claim with the bureau within sixty days from the date
of the accident it is incumbent upon the claimant to show to the bureau a
reasonable cause for the delay.
That where the workmen's compensation bureau refuses to permit
the filing of such a claim on the ground that no reasonable cause was
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shown for failing to fiel the claim within sixty days from the date of the
accident the determination of this issue by the bureau is subject to review
upon appeal; but such review must be based upon the showing made to
the bureau.
That where the workmen's compensation bureau, after a hearing, re-
fuses to permit the filing of the claim after the expiration of the sixty days
from the date of the accident on the ground that no reasonable cause for
the delay was shown the decision of the bureau will be affirmed on appeal
when the evidence presented to the bureau and the record upon which its
holding was made are not presented to the appellate court for review, the
presumption being that the bureau exercised its discretion properly.
That where one claims the right to share in the workmen's compensa-
tion fund, because engaged in a hazardous occupation, it is incumbent upon
the claimant to show he engaged in such hazardous employment under an
appointment or contract of hire express or implied, oral or written, but if
such employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade or busi-
ness of the alleged employer the claimant is not such an employee as is
protected by the fund.
Appeal from the district court of Stutsman County, Swenson, Special
J. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, J. Burke, J. Concurring
spec.
In State of North Dakota for the Benefit of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Fund of the State of North Dakota, and J. T. Wiese, Pltfs. and Applts.,
vs. City of Williston, North Dakota, a municipal corporation, and Joseph
H. LeDosquet, Defts. and Respts.
That where on an appeal taken pursuant to section 7846, C. L. 1913,
as amended by chapter 208, Laws 1933, the appellant demands a retrial of
the entire case, the case must be decided on the record already prepared
in the trial court, and the findings of the trial court must be given appreci-
able weight by the supreme court, especially when based upon the testi-
mony of witnesses who appeared In person before the court.
That in an action for damages for injuries sustained by a person who
fell into an excavation made incident to the laying of water and sewer
pipes leading from the city mains to a dwelling house, the whole record
is reviewed, and it is held, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the trial
court did not err in finding that the party so injured failed to exercise his
due care, and that such want of care on his part contributed proximately
to the injuries sustained.
(Syllabus by the Court)
From a judgment of the district court of Williams County, plaintiffs'
appeal. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the court by Christianson, J..
